FCO Dilemma

Anguilla Is an FCO Dilemma. We all remember David Taylor, Montserrat’s Governor in the early 1990s. He has published an article recently on how the Foreign and Commonwealth Office reacted to the volcano crisis in Montserrat. It is titled: British Colonial Policy in the Caribbean. The Insoluble Dilemma – The Case of Montserrat. It is published in The Round Table (2000), 355 (337-344). Anyone who would like to read a copy should email me.

For our purposes, we must read his comments with a view to better understanding how high British officials see our relationship with Britain. We can always benefit by reading about how others view us. There are things to be learned that will stand us in good stead. This is particularly so when we come to negotiate with the FCO in the coming months and years over our future. Given his background and experience, his views are entitled to be taken very seriously.

Mr Taylor makes some interesting points. He reminds us that when the West Indies Federation broke up in 1962, the smaller islands were de-federated. The Constitutions they acquired then were never intended to be permanent. The islands were on their way into independence. Britain had hoped to be well rid of us by now.

He discusses how come some of us have not yet gone independent. He argues that the persistence of Colonialism in our territories is usually explained in terms of viability. But, it is more complicated than that. He suggests that there has been a tacit agreement between the politicians and their electorates not to ask for it. In their heart of hearts, most politicians would like it. The people, he suspects, regard continuing dependence as a safeguard against weak or corrupt government. The inertia of history also plays a part. He is also perceptive to realize that the present constitutional arrangement suits our political leaders well. It enables them to take the credit for good things. It allows them to blame Britain when things go wrong. They can always fall back on Britain in times of emergency.

He argues that the Governor is halfway to being a constitutional monarch. He must act on the advice of Ministers in most matters. He can take his own decision only in those areas reserved for him. In practice, this means that the Constitution provides continuous opportunities for turf wars between the two. Political pressure is particularly exercised over public service appointments and dismissals. While these are constitutionally clearly matters for the Governor, they often involve hidden pressures and political loyalties.

He points out that there is inevitably and frequently a conflict of interest, or natural difference of agenda, between what Ministers want and what the British Government or the Governor finds acceptable or desirable. He pinpoints the rogue businessmen from the USA and Britain who jet in to sell Ministers plausible but dishonest or environmentally damaging development schemes. He demonstrates that it is not just corruptibility that makes our Ministers susceptible. There is also the pressing need to show results in terms of economic and employment opportunities. The British Government has a different agenda. It is more concerned about legality. They also need to demonstrate, particularly to the USA, toughness against money laundering. More ethereally, and less convincingly, he argues for a British concern for the long-term welfare of the islands, as against short-term political considerations.

His position is that this would not matter very much if the islands’ constitutional arrangements were indeed the prelude to independence, which they were intended to be. Instead, the Governor finds himself holding the line on behalf of the British Government. He must be careful not to set precedents which will make things difficult for his successor. He will be judged in London on what he has prevented from happening rather than on what he has made happen.

The islands are of marginal importance to the FCO. Perhaps this is because they sense their lack of ability to do much about them. They are a continuing potential source of embarrassment. The Audit Office, for example, focuses on progress made to minimize the risk of liabilities falling on the UK taxpayer. FCO communications to a Governor focus on concerns, not on suggesting opportunities. He argues that running a country this way does not prepare it to deal with emergencies. This form of government is ambiguous as to who is responsible for decisions.

The situation is further complicated when there is a division of responsibility at the level of the British Government between DFID and the FCO. In an emergency, there will be confusion as to who is responsible. Is it the Governor, the Ministers, the FCO, or DFID? Each one will have a different perception as to needs as well as to solutions. There will be resentments, differences of perception, and conflicting priorities. His argument is that the Constitution of a British Overseas Territory does not permit of prompt and efficient reaction to natural and other disasters.

Clearly, it is in Britain’s interest for it to be clear that locally elected Ministers of Government are responsible for their own country’s internal matters. The British role should be one of back-up and advice, when it is asked for. The present constitutional arrangement does not make this solution to Britain’s dilemma obvious. His solution to the dilemma is controversial.

He takes the official British position. Advanced colonial constitutions are unequal to the demands of emergencies. Overlapping responsibilities frustrate an effective response to a crisis. The delicate balance between the Governor, the local government, and the FCO, depends on consultation. The result is that there is no one with untrammeled executive control. He concludes that it would be an improvement for the Governor to be able to assume powers of direct rule.

He is wrong, of course. It would be better for it to be absolutely clear that the British Government and the Governor do not have the final say in what happens internally, even in time of emergency. And, this even if it means that the best decisions are not taken. Britain can solve her Overseas Territory dilemma by ensuring that the Constitution lays down that the UK government has as much responsibility for handling an Overseas Territory emergency as the Queen has in the same circumstances in Britain. That is the only solution that would be acceptable today.